During the transition toward a market economy, Russian workers have had to face important structural changes in the labour market as well as dramatic changes in their real earnings. In the process, the wage gap between men and women has varied wildly over that period. In recent years, young women have embraced professional careers, are more mobile on the labour market, and tend to delay the birth of their first child.
Introduction
The Russian economy has witnessed dramatic changes over the course of the last 15-20 years. During the transition toward a market economy, workers have had to face important decreases in their real earnings as well as widespread unemployment. Indeed, Thomas and Stillman (2004) report that in the last half of 1998 alone, real GDP collapsed by as much as 30%. The collapse can be traced back to the price liberalization of January 1992 and a to series of sweeping economic reforms. These included the elimination of most food and fuel subsidies, the use of freely fluctuating market prices and the privatization of many state enterprises. According to the United Nations (1998), the economic downfall that culminated with the 1998 financial crisis can be intimately linked to structural and institutional deficiencies. Indeed, no safety nets were in place to prevent households from falling into poverty [Lokshin and Ravallion (2000) ]. Furthermore, wage arrears and in-kind payments became widespread practice by private firms and public institutions alike, thus increasing income uncertainty [Grogan (2006) , Mroz and Popkin (1995) , Gerry, Li, and Kim (2004) ]. For the majority of Russians, the impact of the 1998 crisis was disastrous. The debacle of commercial banks deprived many households of their hard earned savings during the soviet period and seriously undermined their confidence vis-à-vis financial institutions.
Many reckon that women have suffered more than men from the economic collapse [Glinskaya and Mroz (2000) ]. Indeed, as old enterprises closed down while others faced increased competition, centrally set wages gave way to remuneration based on marginal productivity.
1 Because women were traditionally over-represented in low-paid jobs, market forces may have depressed their relative wages further. Households thus needed to find strategies to deal with unexpected income fluctuations and to maintain a minimum level of consumption. Using data from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS), Lokshin and Yemtsov (2001) have found that in many cases women turned to informal social networks and to government organizations for help. Women were also more likely than men to reduce expenditures on food and clothing. Asymmetric gender responses may partly be explained by the fact that women are better informed about the household budget and market prices, but it is also compatible with men having a greater say with respect to the intra-household allocation of resources.
Enduring economic hardship and fundamental structural changes may have induced the labour market to shift to a new equilibrium. Behavioural changes, in return, can induce changes in social norms which modify the role of partners within the households. During the communist period, great emphasis was placed on employment both as a right and a duty equally for men and women. However, society remained predominantly patriarchal and gender relations within the household continued to reflect a strong "male breadwinner" model [Paci (2002) , Glinskaya and Mroz (2000) ]. In recent years, women's behaviour on the labour market has witnessed important changes: on the one hand, a significant proportion of women have withdrawn from the working force to become housewives. On the other hand, young women appear to be more active than older women. They are more inclined to embrace professional careers, are more mobile on the labour market, and tend to delay the birth of their first child. Finally, Ashwin (2004) has underlined the fact that the traditional role of "breadwinner" can seriously be compromised if the male spouse is unable to secure a high wage, often the cause of his domestic marginalisation.
All these trends inevitably influence intra-household relations and consequently the decision process. Thus behavioural changes on the labour market may reflect not only gender-biased labour markets adjustments, but also changing bargaining power within households.
2 Assessing the extent to which observed behavioural changes are driven by changing intra-household bargaining power is a difficult task. Yet the wild fluctuations in the wage rates over much of the 1990s and the important changes in the labour market participation rates offer a unique opportunity to investigate the inner functioning of the Russian households. To achieve this, one must be willing to assume that the observed household outcomes are Pareto-efficient ("collectively rational"). If one focuses exclusively on the labour supply behaviour, Chiappori(1988 Chiappori( , 1992 has shown that it is possible to recover (up to a constant) the so-called income sharingrule that supports the observed outcomes. This result is particularly useful in our context. Indeed, the dramatic changes that have occurred in the relative wage rates during the 1990s are bound to have impacted the sharing-rule between spouses. We thus seek to investigate this issue through the estimation of a household collective labour supply model. Such models have been widely used in the recent empirical literature. In the majority of cases, though, the analyses have focused exclusively on households in which both spouses participate on the labour market [e.g., Chiappori, Fortin, and Lacroix (2002) ]. In addition to potential selection biases and efficiency loss, focusing exclusively on interior solutions leaves out an important margin of adjustment.
Our strategy consists in estimating a labour supply model that allows for corner solutions for both husbands and wives. The model is inspired from Bloemen (2009) . We generalize the specification so as to allow the sharing rule to change in a discrete manner between the pre and post 1998 periods. The parameter estimates associated with the structural shift can be directly interpreted as a change in the bargaining power within households. The wage rates and the labour supply functions are estimated simultaneously. We also account for discrete unobserved heterogeneity both in the wage and labour supply equations.
On the whole, the behaviour of Russian households can be relatively well approximated by the collective model.
3 The parameters of the sharing-rule indicate that the households have shifted to a new equilibrium in the post-1998 economic crisis. Indeed, when their relative wage increases, husbands (wives) transfer relatively less (more) to their spouse than was previously the case.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the data and discusses the main features of the 1998 financial crisis in Russia and stresses the manner in which it may have impacted intrahousehold bargaining power. In Section 3 we present the household collective labour supply model and indicate how the sharing rule can be made period-specific. The econometric and statistical specifications are presented in section 4. Finally, Section 5 discusses the main empirical results.
Data and Institutional Environment
The data we use are drawn from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey, Phase-II. The RLMS is a household-based representative survey of Russia designed to measure the effects of the reforms implemented through the 1990s on the economic well-being of households and individuals.
4 Data collection under Phase II covers the period from 1994 (October) until 2004. Unfortunately, no data were collected in the years immediately preceding and following the 1998 financial crisis, although the year 1998 was surveyed.
Our sample is composed of intact couples in which wives and husbands are aged between 16 and 55 and 16 and 60, respectively. We exclude full-time students as well as those who are unable to work for health reasons, women on maternity leave, and finally those who are involuntarily unemployed (i.e. unemployed and looking for a job). The latter are excluded to insure that nonemployment is a choice rather than a constraint. Our sample thus comprises 1,953 distinct households yielding 4,118 observations. Nearly half of all households are only observed once.
5 Over the course of our panel, 2,545 households are dual earners, 517 are male breadwinners, 476 are female breadwinners, and 580 have no earners. Table 1 provides some basic descriptive statistics about the sample. As expected husbands are slightly older than their spouse, and both have very similar educational attainments. Over the entire period (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) , husbands have enjoyed an unconditional 10% wage advantage over their spouse.
6 The table also provides information about children, region 4 All the information on the RLMS data may be found on the project's web page: http://www.cpc.unc.edu/rlms. 5 The distribution of the number of years in the panel is the following: 1=1,039, 2=343, 3=229, 4=140, 5=106, 6=61, 7=31, 8=3,9=1. 6 The extent of multiple job holding is probably more important in Russia than in most Western countries. The RLMS survey tries to capture this phenomenon by asking individuals to report firstly their working hours and earnings from their main occupation, secondly the hours and earnings from the second job and finally earnings from any additional paid work such as "sewing someone a dress, ..., looking after a sick person...". In each round, approximately 15% of working individuals report two or more jobs. The labour supply model used in the paper is based on the time allocation between market work and leisure. We thus aggregate the hours reported in each job. However, the data on earnings from secondary jobs are less reliable.
of residence, and the sample distribution across survey years. Indeed, additional jobs are mostly occasional or informal. As a consequence, the reported earnings vary wildly and exhibit too many extreme values. Assuming that the main occupation is the most reliable source of data, we measure the wage rate as the earnings on the main job divided by the corresponding hours of work. The wage rates corresponding to the secondary jobs are used only if the first job earnings are not reported.
The Evolving Labour Market
As mentioned earlier, the sweeping reforms that were introduced in the 1990s up until the major financial crisis of 1998 have probably triggered changes in the institutional environment and social norms that may be reflected in the labour market behaviour of spouses. Prima facie evidence on the changing labour market adjustments is provided in Figure 1 The dotted line in the figure depicts the relative (husband/wife) hourly (log) wage ratios.
7 The scale of the dotted line appears on the right-hand side of the figure. Prior to the crisis, wives' wage rates amounted to more or less 90% of their husbands' wage rates but were declining slowly. During the crisis, wage rates decreased dramatically. The decrease of men's wages was much stronger than that of women. Consequently, wives' wage rates nearly doubled those of their husbands in 1998. Some have suggested that this is partly explained by the collapse of the high-wage sectors that were traditionally reserved to men [see Goskomstat Rossii (1999) , Bobyleva (2001) ].
These trends are also confirmed by simple regression analyses. Table 2 reports the results of regressing the (log) ratio of husband/wife wage rates on a series of exogenous variables. These include each spouse's age and schooling, and a series of regional and year dummy variables. According to the parameter estimates, the wage gap decreases with the husbands age and his wife's schooling level, but increases with his own level of schooling. Households living in the Volga region have larger wage gaps than those living Eastern Siberia/Far East region, while the converse holds for those living in Western Siberia. The year dummy variables are consistent with the pattern depicted in Figure 1 . Relative to 1998, the (log) wage gap varies between 23% and 30% in the years 1994-1996, decreases significantly in 1998, and increases steadily between 2000 and 2004.
8 Table 3 reports the parameter estimates of pooled probit regressions on participation for each spouse separately. These regressions are only intended to confirm or invalidate the trends observed in Figure 1 . In both cases, age and education are important determinants of labour force participation. Likewise, most regional dummy variables are statistically significant. Interestingly, wives living in the Moscow-St-Petersberg regions are no more likely to work than 7 The period 1994-2004 was plagued by very high inflation. During the transition phase sellers would post prices in "units" that needed to be translated into roubles using the Rouble/US $ exchange rate. We thus convert the wage rates into US$ using the official exchange rates [see Goskomstat Rossii (2005) ]. 8 Glinskaya and Mroz (2000) report very similar wage gaps for the years 1992-1995 using RMLS data. See also Gerry, Li, and Kim (2004) for a detailed analysis of the gender wage gap for the years 1994-1998. As a last piece of evidence, Table 4 reports the results of fitting a pooled tobit model on the weekly hours of work using the same specification as in the probit regressions. Once again, age and schooling appear to be important determinants of the weekly hours of work and exhibit the usual concave shape. According to the parameter estimates, the typical number of weekly hours of work varies significantly between regions. In particular, women in the MoscowSt-Petersberg regions work fewer hours than those living in the Eastern Siberia region. According to the year dummy variables, women appear to have had a fairly stable workweek over the 1994-2004 period despite the major economic downturn of 1998. Men, on the other hand, have had shorter workweeks during that period but have since returned to their pre-crisis level. All in all, the patterns depicted in Figure 1 are fairly robust. These show that the wives' wage rates have decreased significantly relative to their husbands' wage rates starting with the financial crisis of 1998. Yet despite this their participation rates and their workweek have remained relatively stable. 9 It is thus likely that the wives' share of household income has decreased significantly over that period. Such important changes may very well impact the distribution of welfare within the households. Each year the RLMS investigates this issue in a qualitative manner. Spouses are asked to report their subjective "satisfaction level" with their economic conditions. Table 5 Responses are graduated from 1 to 5, with 1 corresponding to the highest level of satisfaction and 5 to the lowest. Interestingly, couples in our sample report being very unsatisfied with their economic conditions in the year 2000. Indeed, both spouses consistently report being "less than satisfied" or "Not at all satisfied". In 2004, by contrast, the majority of wives still report being unsatisfied while most husbands report being relatively satisfied.
Obviously, being satisfied or unsatisfied with one's economic conditions does not imply a gain or a loss of welfare. One may be unsatisfied with one's conditions but still benefit from intrahousehold transfers from his/her spouse. The regressions above and the available qualitative information nevertheless do suggest that spouses have had to adapt their behaviour to a changing economic environment. These changes inevitably influence intra-family relations and consequently the decision process. The behavioural adjustments may reflect not only gender-biased crisis effects, but also a new equilibrium bargaining power within households. Assuming Russian households behave in a Pareto-efficient manner, it is possible to investigate how the labour market adjustments affect the intra-household allocation of welfare.
9 The stability of the wage and participation equations has been investigated thoroughly by Radtchenko (2006) based on regressions similar to those reported in Tables  2 and 3 . She finds that the participation equations are stable over the 1994-1996 and 1998-2004 periods, but that the parameter estimates are distinct between the two periods. On the other hand, there does not appear to be any structural break in the wage equations of both husbands and wives. although we allow the presence of children and relatives (elderly). 12 Each has his own standard utility function 13 that depends on leisure (assignable and observed), L j , and a Hicksian composite good (unobserved), C j . Prices are normalized to 1. In the collective model, the decision process is assumed to yield Pareto-efficient solutions to the household resource allocation problem. Consumption is decentralized by the appropriate choice of full-income shares Φ j derived from the bargaining process.
The maximization program can thus be formulated as:
(1)
where t indicates the year, w jt are the hourly wage rates, h jt are the labour 12 The presence of elderly parents is frequent in Russian households. We acknowledge that elderly parents and grown-up children may influence the decision-making process [see, e.g., Fortin, Dauphin, El Lhaga, and Lacroix (2008) ]. We omit this possibility in order to keep the model tractable. Indeed, most analyses of the collective model with multiple decision-makers focus on consumption data to avoid corner solutions. See Browning and Chiappori (1998) , Chiappori and Ekeland (2006) . 13 We could alternatively assume each spouse has "caring" preferences, i.e.
These preferences allow for interdependence of altruistic utility but impose weak separability between goods consumed by a household member and those consumed by his or her spouse. The assumption of egotistic or "caring" preferences is necessary to identify the collective model in our framework. The main implication of the model is to allow household decisions to be decentralized into a two-step process, whereby individuals first share their total nonlabor income according to some sharing rule and then maximize their own utilities subject to separate budget constraints. In particular, the intrahousehold decision process can be fully summarized by the sharing rule.
14 We index the variables in the maximization problem by t to highlight the fact that we use panel data when estimating the model. We remove them in the remainder of the section to ease reading.
supply functions, and y f t and y mt are female and male non-labour income.
To avoid addressing the issue of corner solutions, most empirical papers based on the collective model have so far limited their samples to working couples [see e.g. Chiappori, Fortin, and Lacroix (2002) ]. Donni (2003) proposes an innovative approach for taking into account corner solutions. He assumes that the household labour supply functions are continuous in the neighbourhood of a so-called participation frontier. Along this frontier each household member is indifferent to the participation status of his/her spouse. Donni (2003) shows that under this assumption both the preferences and the sharing rule are identified up to a constant as in Chiappori(1988 Chiappori( , 1992 .
To fix ideas, let
be the reservation wage of spouse j, where U j H and U j C are the partial derivatives of the utility function with respect to working hours and consumption, and y is the total household non-labour income. This function describes the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption calculated at H = 0 (L = T ). Thus the reservation wage of spouse j is implicitly defined as a function of non-labour income and his or her partner's wage. In order to guarantee the uniqueness of the reservation wages, Donni (2003) assumes that the preferences and the sharing rule are such that for each (w * f , w * m , y) and (w f , w m , y) the following condition holds:
This condition is implicitly equivalent to assuming that the wage effects on the shares of each spouse not be "too large". 15 The condition in (2) implies two important results [Donni (2003) , Blundell, Chiappori, Magnac, and Meghir (2007) 
The intuition behind this result is the following. In the case where both husband and wife work, the first and second order derivatives of the labour supply functions generate a set of partial differential equations that can be solved to identify the sharing-rule up to an additive constant. Donni (2003) has shown that if only one spouse works, then the set of partial differential equations is also satisfied as w i → γ j (·). Thus the participation frontier, γ j (·), serves as a boundary condition for the system of differential equations.
The solution of the program (1) with due allowance for corner solutions yields:
The Labour Supply Model
The labour supply functions are assumed to be log-linear, i.e.
The structural parameters are indexed by D so that they may vary between the pre and the post 1998 crisis, i.e.
The last terms on the right hand-side capture male, female and household characteristics, i.e.
Denote ∆ = Φ m −Φ f . Given the budget constraint Φ = Φ f +Φ m , the individual shares can be written as:
Thus in log form
. The results of Kalugina, Radtchenko, and Sofer (2009) and Radtchenko (2007) show that in the RLMS data the shares of two household members are usually of the same order. Consequently d is likely relatively small and by Taylor expansion we get
The individual shares Φ m and Φ f are defined by (7) and (8) in terms of Φ = (w m + w f )T + y, and d which we specify below. Substituting (9) into (7) and (8) the labour supply functions become
whereδ jD = δ jD − ln(0.5), j = m, f .
Introducing Non-Participation
The continuity condition on the participation frontier applies to the labour supply functions as well as the sharing rule. Indeed, the latter is intimately related to the participation status of both spouses. Thus, given our specification of the sharing rule, the continuity condition hinges upon d being continuous as each spouse's labour supply tends to zero. The following transformation of d insures continuity along the participation frontier:
where r mD and r f D are the parameters describing the continuity of the sharing rule derivatives on the participation frontier. When one's spouse is not working, the labour supply functions become (upon substituting d * and regrouping terms):
where s m and s f are the parameters that insure the continuity of the labour supply functions. The parameters r mD and r f D are related to s mD and s f D through the following constraints:
As with any endogenous tobit model, the issue of coherency must be addressed [see Gourieroux, Laffont, and Monfort (1980) , Lacroix and Fortin (1992) and Fortin, Lacroix, and Villeval (2007) ]. It can easily be shown that the coherency condition in our model boils down to [see also Bloemen (2009)] :|s m · s f | < 1. This condition needs to be verified once the model is estimated.
Sharing Rule Specification and Reduced-Form Model
Individual income shares are not observed in the data. Consequently, the sharing-rule in (9) must be specified explicitly. Let d be a function of the log-wages [ln(w m ), ln(w f ), ln(w m ) 2 , ln(w f ) 2 ], and individual and household characteristics, X m , X f , X f m :
is the vector of corresponding coefficients.
16 By substituting d in the labour supply functions (12) we get:
In their reduced-form, equations (11) and (12) are given by:
The structural parameters corresponding to the wage rates and the sharingrule are all identified [see equations (5) and (6)]:
From the structural parameters we can compute the elasticities of the sharing rule with respect to the wage rates:
Because individual shares Φ m and Φ f are neither observed nor measured, the marginal effects can only be calculated for arbitrary values of the household income sharing, for example at half of the total income:
The model of the previous section focused entirely on the labour supply. In particular, it assumes that wage rates are observed even in the event a spouse is not working. We must thus specify a wage function for spouse j at time t:
where
The equation states that the wage rates depend upon observed characteristics, z jt , as well as time-invariant unobserved characteristics, π j , and a contemporaneous shock, u jt . We also allow the wage function to shift in a discrete manner between the pre and post 1998 periods through the parameter δ j .
Let X jt be the vector of individual characteristics of the household member j that proxies his/her preferences and which may also affect the sharing rule. Furthermore, let ν jt and λ j represent unobserved heterogeneity variables that are time-dependent and time-independent, respectively. The reduced-form labour supply model can then be written as:
where a D and b D are the parameter vectors of the reduced forms (13) and (14), respectively, and x mt and x f t are the corresponding vectors of explanatory variables.
18
The contemporaneous error terms (u mt , u f t , ν mt , ν f t ) of the wage and labour supply equations are assumed to have a joint normal distribution with mean 0 and covariance matrix Σ uν :
The error terms are thus assumed to be independent across households. As in Bloemen (2009), we allow nonzero correlations between spouses' labour supply and wage equations. Each spouse's labour supply function is further assumed to be correlated to his/her wage function. The zeros on the diagonal reflect the fact that we do not allow the wage rate and the hours of work to be correlated across spouses. Consequently, the covariance matrix of error terms of the wage and labour supply equations in (23) is given by:
It should be noted that s * m and s * f take zero or non zero values depending on the participation status of both partners. Thus, the covariance matrix differs according to 18 Additive heterogeneity can be shown not to affect the identification of the sharingrule since the additive constant is not identified. the four possible participation regimes (both partners work, one works, none work).
The contemporaneous error terms (u mt , u f t , ν mt , ν f t ) are assumed to be independent of the individual random effects (π f ,π m ,λ f ,λ m ). Following Hoynes (1996) , and in the spirit of Heckman and Singer (1984) , we assume that the individual random effects follow a discrete distribution with a finite number of realizations.
19 More precisely, we assume that the terms (π
There are thus K × K possible types of household configuration in the model.
Likelihood Function
The complete model is defined by equations (21), (23) and (24). Because the covariance matrix (24) is positive definite, it can be decomposed as follows:
where L is a lower triangular (Cholesky) matrix. The constraints σ 14 = 0 and σ 23 = 0 in Σ uν translate into constraints on the parameters of the matrix L. Indeed, since σ 14 = l 11 l 41 and σ 23 = l 21 l 31 + l 22 l 32 , it follows that l 41 = 0 and l 32 = −l 21 l 31 /l 22 . Naturally, we do not observe a wage rate for individuals who do not work. We must therefore integrate over the whole domain to complete the likelihood function. The conditional likelihood function is given by:
In earlier work, we estimated the model using a standard random effects model. Because over half of our sample is only observed once (1040 out of 1953 households, we deem preferable to use a parsimonious discrete specification thus avoiding to turn to specific parametric distributions. Michaud and Vermeulen (2006) have recently estimated a discrete-choice collective household labour supply model in which unobserved heterogeneity is modelled in a similar fashion.
where the bounds b m , b f are defined as
and where f r is the normal density function of dimension r. The unconditional likelihood function is obtained by summing over the unobserved heterogeneity components:
Results

Reduced-Form Parameters
The parameter estimates of the reduced-form model [equations (13) and (14)] are presented in Tables 6-10. Table 6 focuses on the labour supply functions. For each spouse, the parameter estimates are divided into two columns according to whether D = 0 or D = 1. In general, the full-income variable has a negative impact on labour supply, but is statistically significant only in the husbands' equation in the post-1998 period. An increase in the husbands' wage rate has a negative impact on their own labour supply in the pre-1998 period, but a positive one in the post-1998 period, and no effect on the wives' labour supply. The wives' wage rates, on the other hand, have no effect on either labour supplies in both periods. 20 The second panel of the table reports the parameters estimates associated with X m , X f , X f m , respectively. According to the table, schooling has a positive effect on weekly hours of work of both husbands and wives, and pre-schoolers exert a negative impact on husbands' hours of work. There are no statistical differences between the pre and the post 1998 periods.
The dummy variable Post-1998 indicates that both husbands and wives have increased their labour supply following the financial crisis of 1998. The parameter estimate aggregates changes at the intensive and extensive margins, but is nevertheless consistent with the results of Table 4 and the evidence presented in Figure 1 . In addition to this discrete change in labour supply, we can investigate whether the parameter estimates change in a significant manner between the two periods. We first test the parameter estimates of non-labour income and wages simultaneously. For husbands, we find χ 2 =24.82, thus rejecting equality. For wives, we have χ 2 =4.71. The null assumption of equality is not rejected. This is hardly surprising given most parameter estimates are not statistically significant. The null assumption that both husbands and wives' parameters do not change yields a statistics of χ 2 =45.34, thus rejecting it. We can similarly test the equality of "preference" variables between the two periods. The null assumption is once again rejected for husbands (χ 2 = 14.22) and for wives at the 10% level (χ 2 = 8.17). When combined, the null assumption is also rejected (χ 2 = 23.03). These results suggest that both the preferences and the determinants of the relative bargaining power of the spouses may have changed between pre and post 1998.
The parameter estimates of the wage equations are reported in Table 7 .
20
The P-values of the null assumption that the wages (ln w j , (ln w j ) 2 ) have no effect on labour supply are the following: The wage equations include regional dummy variables that are absent from the hours equations. This exclusion restriction is motivated by the fact that auxiliary regressions has shown that once we condition on wages, there is little regional variation in weekly hours of work. On the other hand, children variables are included in
The table shows that the wage rates decrease slightly with age and increase by approximately 4% with an additional year of schooling. Such a rate of return is certainly low by Western standards. Yet they coincide perfectly with those reported in Cheidvaaser and Benitez-Silva (2007) . 22 The table also shows that wages vary considerably across regions for both husbands and wives. Not surprisingly, wages are highest in the Moscow-St-Petersberg regions, and lowest in the Volga and North Caucus regions. The dummy variable D captures any shift that may have occurred in the wage functions in the post-1998 period above and beyond those that are already controlled for in the regression. It shows that both husbands and wives have benefited from increases of 11% and 5%, respectively. This is consistent with the results reported in Table 2 that indicated that the husbands/wives wage ratios were increasing. Indeed, the results presented in Table 2 were based on households in which both spouses are working. In Table 7 , on the other hand, the estimation includes husbands and wives whose spouses do not work. It is thus conceivable that wives whose husbands do not work are a self-selected group whose earning are larger than the average.
23
Recall from equation (23) that both the labour supply equations and the wage equations contain random effects and correlated error terms. The parameters of the unobserved heterogeneity are presented in Table 8 . The first two lines of the table relate to the labour supply functions.
24 According to the parameter estimates, type 1 husbands have a stronger preference for work than type 2 while the converse holds for wives. The next two lines of the table rethe hours regressions but not in the wage regressions. 22 The low rate of return was traditionally attributed to government "wagesqueezing" policies. It was conjectured that the rate of return would increase as Russia moved towards market democracy [see Brainerd (1998) ]. Cheidvaaser and Benitez-Silva (2007) attribute the low rate of return to education in post-cummunist Russia to an excess supply of well-educated workers. 23 One could also argue the opposite: wives with inactive husbands are willing to work at lower than average wage rates. While plausible, this situation is more likely when husbands are involuntarily unemployed. In principle, there are no involuntarily unemployed individuals in our sample. 24 The model is estimated with only two pairs (π k j , λ k j ). The data support up to three pairs of parameters. Unfortunately, one of the pairs always has a very small probability of realization. To avoid over-parameterizing the model, we focus on the more parsimonious specification.
port the unobserved heterogeneity components of the wage equations. While every parameter estimates are statistically significant, the null assumptions
f can not be rejected. Thus contrary to the labour supply functions, unobserved heterogeneity appear not to be an important factor in determining the wage rates of husbands and wives. Recall that there are potentially four types of households in the data. Table 9 reports the distribution of household types. By far the most common type corresponds to (λ 2 m , λ 2 f ) and (ω 2 m , ω 2 f ). Other configurations occur with much smaller probabilities (1.4%, 4.2% and 6.8%). One can thus conjecture that the control variables are capturing a sizeable amount of individual heterogeneity so that there is little room for unobserved heterogeneity parameters.
Finally, we report the parameter estimates of the covariance matrix (24) in Table 10 . The matrix Σ uν captures the covariances between the contemporaneous error terms of the wage and labour supply equations. The estimates indicate that the spouses' wage rates are very weakly correlated with their own labour supply (σ umνm = 0.008 and σ u f ν f = −0.007 ) and between themselves (σ umu f = 0.011). On the other hand, their labour supply functions are strongly correlated (σ νmν f = 0.330). Taken as a whole, the parameter estimates of the unobserved heterogeneity suggest that the households in our sample are relatively homogeneous (only one important type ), conditional on observed covariates, and that there is little selection into employment that may be linked to unobservable characteristics that simultaneously affect the wages and the hours of work. On the other hand, unobserved shocks that may increase (or decrease) participation of both spouses are strongly correlated. This suggests that factors that are not controlled for in the hours equations affect spouses in a similar fashion.
Structural Parameters
The parameters of the structural model [equations (12) and (13)] are reported in Table 11 . As is customarily found in the literature, we find a negative relationship between own wage and labour supply for men and a positive one for women (α f D > 0, α mD < 0).
25 The parameter estimates of γ f D and γ mD are negative and statistically significant in the post-1998 period which suggests leisure is a normal good. The table also reports the parameters associated with the wage rates in the sharing-rule. Finally, the labour supply continuity parameters S and s easily verify the coherency condition of the model (i.e. |s m · s f | < 1). We comment below on the interpretation of the labour supply and sharing-rule continuity parameters.
26
From the parameters of Table 11 , a number of interesting statistics can be computed. 27 First, recall from equations (15) and (16) that the elasticity of each spouse's share on income can be computed with respect to both wages rates. These are reported in the top panel of Table 12 . Bearing in mind that not all are statistically significant, the table nevertheless reveals interesting changes between the pre and post 1998 periods. To start with, a ten percentage point increase in husbands' wage rates increases their relative income share way more in the aftermath of the financial crisis. According to the table, such a change would have translated into a 5.2% increase before 1998 and by as much as 9.2% after 1998. The same wage increase would have increased the wives' share by 3.3% and 0.9%, respectively. This means that as the husbands' wage rates increased in the years that followed the economic downfall, they have kept a greater share of the additional full income to themselves. Wives, on the other hand, have behaved differently. The table shows that a 10 percentage point increase in their wages translated into a 7.8% increase of their share prior to 1998 and approximately 6.6% after 1998. Thus while both husbands and wives do behave altruistically, or behave in a manner which is consistent with "caring" preferences, wives in the post-crisis period seem to transfer a greater share of family full-income than husbands do, contrary to what prevailed in 26 Just as we did with the reduced-form parameters, we could test whether the structural parameters change between pre and post 1998. Unfortunately, all the structural parameters are functions of the parameter of Φ(·). Because this parameter is only statistically significant for men in the post-1998 period, the tests are of little quantitative value. 27 Most of these are highly non-linear functions of the structural parameters. So while few of these are individually statistically significant, it may the case that these non-linear functions turn out to be significant once the covariance between the parameter estimates are taken into account. Furthermore, the elasticities in Table 12 are intimately related to the parameters of the sharing-rule, i.e. γ mD and γ f D . Unfortunately, non-labour or full-income parameters are rarely statistically significant [see e.g. Fortin and Lacroix (1997) ].
the pre-crisis period.
The next panel of the table presents the impact of a unit increase in each spouse's wage rate on their relative full-income assuming it is initially divided into equal shares. The calculations are based upon equations (18) and (20). These results are central to the paper but their validity depends on the assumption of equal sharing holding true. A unit increase in the hourly wage rate of a spouse automatically increases full-income by 168$ (T = 168 hours per week). The table indicates that, prior to 1998, an increase in the husbands' wage rates would have increased their share of the full-income by 102.73$ and that of their wives by 65.27$. In the post 1998 period, an identical change in their wage rates would have increased their share by 152.12$ and that of the wives by only 15.87$. The marginal impact of an increase in wives' hourly wage rates is completely different. Indeed, prior to 1998 they would have kept nearly all the increase in the family full-income to themselves (167.49$). In the post 1998 period, they would have kept 125.98$ to themselves and transferred 42.02$ to their husbands. What these estimates suggest is that spouses do not behave in an egotistic manner. An increase in their wage rates do increase their share of the household income but not at the expense of their spouse. Both benefit from the additional income. The estimates do suggest, however, that in the post-1998 period, as the economic environment got better, husbands became somewhat more egotistic and wives somewhat more altruistic.
The behavioural changes relative to the full-income sharing is bound to impact the labour supply elasticities. To investigate this, we report two different types of elasticities in Table 13 . The top panel reports the own-wage elasticities computed under the assumption that the sharing-rule in unaffected by the increase in the wage rate.
28 The elasticities reported in the bottom panel account for the additional income effects accruing from changes in the sharing of the full-income. The results of the top panel indicate the elasticities are relatively constant across periods for both husbands and wives. Once again the results relative to the husbands are relatively more precise. The bottom panel tells a different story. First, the impact of a marginal increase in the husbands' wage rates on their labour supply increases from -0.05 to -0.20 between the pre and post crisis periods. This is essentially due to the fact that husbands transfer less income to their spouse in the post-1998 period. Likewise, an increase in the wives' wage rates has a negative impact on their husbands' labour supply in the post-1998 period. This is a consequence of transferring them more income than was previously the case. As a matter of fact, the estimates suggest that in the pre-1998 period (bottom line) wive's wage rates had no impact on their husbands labour supply precisely because they essentially kept the additional full-income to themselves. Finally, the table shows that the wives labour supply elasticities are generally negative (although not statistically significant) once the sharing-rule is accounted for. This follows from the fact that an increase in their own wage rate, or that of their husbands, translates into an increase in their full-income.
The above elasticities are derived under the assumption that both spouses work. Recall from equations (10), (11) and (12) that the labour supply functions and the sharing-rule change according to the participation status of each spouse. The continuity parameters are presented in Table 11 . The labour supply continuity parameters s m and s f insure the statistical coherency of the model with four participation regimes but also underline the importance of taking into account the participation status of each spouse on the own-wage elasticity of their labour supply. For example, given that husbands have a negative own-wage elasticity and wives have a negative own-share elasticity, a positive value of s m implies that if wives stop working then the elasticity of husbands' labour supply with respect to their wage will increase. This effect occurs via income transfers from husbands to their wives. The same reasoning applies, mutatis mutandis to wives through the parameter s f . Likewise, a change in the participation status of one of the spouse in the post-1998 crisis influences the manner in which the household full-income is distributed. For example, given that husbands have a negative own-wage elasticity, a positive value of r f implies that if they were to stop working then the elasticity of their income share with respect to their own wage would decrease [see equation (10)]. Likewise, because r m < 0 if wives were to stop working their elasticity would also decrease. These results highlight the importance of taking into account the participation status of each spouse because the intra-household income distribution is intimately related to it.
CONCLUSION
This paper investigates the evolution of the intra-household income allocation among Russian households over a period of significant economic turmoil. The main thrust behind the paper is the recognition that the important changes in the economic and institutional environment that have occurred in Russia over the 1994-2004 period may have triggered important behavioural changes. Adaptation to the major economic downturn of 1994-1998 and to the eventual recovery of 2000-2004 may indeed have brought spouses to a new economic equilibrium. We first document these changes by looking at the evolution of the participation rates and the spouses' relative wages using data from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey. Surely, the most impressive change relates to the dramatic decline in the wage rates, and primarily that of male workers in the year 1998. In the years that followed, male workers have managed to regain some of the loss more rapidly than their spouses. Thus not only did the gender wage gap increase during the 2000-2004 period, but so did the intra-household wage gap.
It is thus important to assess how such changes may have impacted the intrahousehold distribution of welfare within Russian households. Fortunately, if one is willing to assume that the households behave in a Pareto-efficicient manner, then it is possible to focus on labour market outcomes to indirectly infer the impact of the changing economic environment on individual welfare. We propose a model that is inspired from the works of Bloemen (2009) and Donni (2003) . The model assumes Pareto-efficient outcomes and admits both interior and corner solutions on working hours. Wage rates and the labour supply functions are estimated simultaneously. The main novelty of the empirical model is to allow the parameters of the sharing-rule to change in a discrete manner between the pre and post 1998 periods.
The main empirical result of the paper suggests that spouses behave in a cooperative manner. An increase in the husband or wife's wage rate benefits both spouses. On the other hand, we find that in the 2000-2004 period, as the economy got better, husbands and wives' behaviour changed somewhat: An increase in their relative wage translates into a smaller/larger transfer to their spouse. This paper attempts to investigate the impact of the enormous shocks the Russian economy has gone through on individual welfare. Given the nature of our results, further research is certainly warranted. We acknowledge that the empirical and theoretical analyses rest on relatively strong assumptions. Chief among these is the implicit assumption that households are only composed of two decision makers. The recent literature suggest that adult children and elderly parents may also have a say on the decision process. Because Russian households typically include elderly parents, this issue should be accounted for in future research. Furthermore, the empirical model could be refined to allow greater intertemporal interdependence of intra-household decisions. Dynamic collective models are still in their inception but are surely pertinent for the type of problem we investigate in this paper. The important changes that have occurred on the Russian labour market over the last 15 years and the availability of quality data offer an excellent basis to develop and validate the collective models in numerous directions. 
